

R 231224Z JUL 92  
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7184  
INFO AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
AMEMBASSY LIMA  
AMEMBASSY MEXICO  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR  
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM  
CIA WASHDC  
DIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BOGOTA 10667

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT THROUGHOUT)

SOUTHCOS ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: [KPRP](#) [PINR](#) [PINS](#) [PGOV](#) [CO](#)  
SUBJECT: "SNOW WHITE AND THE FOUR DWARFS" -- BIOS OF  
FARC'S 5-MAN SECRETARIAT

11. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.

12. SUMMARY: THE HIGHEST DECISION-MAKING BODY OF THE  
REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC), COLOMBIA'S  
OLDEST AND LARGEST GUERRILLA GROUP, IS ITS FIVE-MEMBER  
GENERAL SECRETARIAT, COMPOSED SINCE AUGUST 1990 OF  
LEGENDARY FARC HEAD MANUEL MARULANDA VELEZ ("TIROFIJO"),  
POLITICAL CHIEF ALFONSO CANO, RAUL REYES, TIMOLEON JIMENEZ  
AND IVAN MARQUEZ. THE FIVE COME FROM DIVERSE BACKGROUNDS,  
AND THE FARC'S HISTORICAL DISTINCTIONS -- CAMPESINOS VS.  
INTELLECTUALS, OLDTIMERS VS. NEWCOMERS -- ARE EVIDENT  
AMONG THEM. THE SECRETARIAT, WHICH HAS BEEN REFERRED TO  
AS "SNOW WHITE AND THE FOUR DWARFS" TO ILLUSTRATE THE  
DIFFERENCE IN STATURE BETWEEN MARULANDA AND THE REST, CAN  
ALSO BE CHARACTERIZED AS FOUR HARDLINERS VS. ONE MODERATE,  
CANO. A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE FARC IS THAT THERE  
APPEARS TO BE NO ONE CAPABLE OF REPLACING MARULANDA, THE  
GLUE THAT HOLDS THE FARC TOGETHER. THIS CABLE PROVIDES  
BIOGRAPHIES OF THE FIVE FARC SECRETARIAT MEMBERS, AND  
FULFILLS THE POST REPORTING PLAN REQUIREMENTS FOR BIOS ON  
THE SECRETARIAT (JUNE) AND MARULANDA (AUGUST). END  
SUMMARY.

INTRODUCTION  
-----

13. POLOFF GLEANED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FROM MANY  
CONVERSATIONS OVER THE BETTER PART OF A YEAR WITH SEVERAL  
CONTACTS, INCLUDING, FIRST AND FOREMOST, COLOMBIAN  
BUSINESSMAN MORITZ AKERMAN. AKERMAN IS AN EX-COMMUNIST  
PARTY ACTIVIST WHO IS CLOSE TO ALFONSO CANO AND KNOWS IVAN  
MARQUEZ. INFORMATION WAS ALSO DERIVED FROM CANO'S  
BROTHER, ROBERTO SAENZ (HIMSELF A COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVIST  
UNTIL NOVEMBER 1991); CARLOS EDUARDO JARAMILLO, A GOC  
PEACE NEGOTIATOR FOR FIVE YEARS WHO KNOWS CANO AND MARQUEZ  
WELL AND HAS MET MARULANDA AND THE REST AT THE FARC'S  
FORMER CASA VERDE SANCTUARY; ACADEMIC GUERRILLA EXPERT  
EDUARDO PIZARRO, EX-COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVIST AND BROTHER  
OF ASSASSINATED M-19 HEAD CARLOS PIZARRO, AND OTHERS.

14. BECAUSE OF THEIR WORK AS GUERRILLA PEACE NEGOTIATORS  
FRON, JUNE 1991-JUNE 1992, CANO AND MARQUEZ ARE WELL-KNOWN  
OUTSIDE OF THE FARC. CANO IS BY FAR THE BEST-KNOWN  
SECRETARIAT MEMBER IN BOGOTA, DESPITE HIS DOZEN YEARS IN  
CLANDESTINITY. AKERMAN, PIZARRO AND JARAMILLO WERE  
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY CLASSMATES OF CANO'S. MARULANDA, A  
LIVING LEGEND, OBVIOUSLY IS WELL-KNOWN. RAUL REYES IS  
KNOWN IN BOGOTA BECAUSE OF HIS LINKS TO THE PARTY'S  
HIERARCHY. THE LEAST KNOWN BY FAR (AT LEAST IN THE  
CAPITAL) IS TIMOLEON JIMENEZ, A CAMPESINO WHO GREW UP IN  
THE INSURGENCY.

MANUEL MARULANDA: MORE CAMPESINO THAN COMMUNIST

-----  
¶5. THE FARC HAS BEEN CALLED AN ARMY OF SEVERAL COLONELS BUT ONLY ONE GENERAL; MANUEL MARULANDA VELEZ IS THAT GENERAL. AT 64, MARULANDA IS LATIN AMERICA'S OLDEST AND MOST EXPERIENCED GUERRILLA LEADER. HE'S BEEN AN INSURGENT FOR 43 YEARS, SINCE BEFORE CASTRO'S REVOLUTION.

¶6. IN 1949, DURING COLOMBIA'S LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE CIVIL WAR, KNOWN AS "LA VIOLENCIA," MARULANDA (REAL NAME PEDRO ANTONIO MARIN), JOINED THE LIBERAL GUERRILLA OPPOSITION TO THE CONSERVATIVE DICTATORSHIP. WHILE MARULANDA BEGAN AS A LIBERAL GUERRILLA, BY THE TIME LA VIOLENCIA HAD ENDED HE HAD BECOME A COMMUNIST REBEL LEADER. LIKE MANY OF THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY'S EARLY LEADERS, MARULANDA HAILS FROM AND BEGAN HIS GUERRILLA CAREER IN TOLIMA.

¶7. THE NOM DE GUERRE MANUEL MARULANDA VELEZ WAS ADOPTED FROM THE COMMUNIST LABOR LEADER OF THE SAME NAME, A PARTICIPANT IN THE VIOLENT 1925 LABOR STRIFE AND LATER A FOUNDER OF THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCC). THE COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCES GAVE MARULANDA (MARIN) THE NICKNAME "TIROFIJO" (SURE SHOT), WHICH HAS STUCK. INSIDE THE INSURGENCY, HOWEVER, WHERE IT'S CONSIDERED SOMEWHAT PEJORATIVE, NO ONE CALLS HIM THAT; HE'S "COMANDANTE MARULANDA" TO HIS FARC UNDERLINGS.

¶8. THERE ARE MANY SIDES TO MARULANDA. HE'S A CAMPESINO, GUERRILLA, COMMUNIST, SOLDIER, POLITICIAN, ALL ROLED INTO ONE. HE IS, HOWEVER, A CAMPESINO LEADER FIRST, A COMMUNIST SECOND; MORE ZAPATA OR PANCHE VILLA THAN LENIN OR STALIN.

¶9. VARIOUS SOURCES HAVE REPORTED THAT SINCE LEADING HIS OWN "GREAT MARCH" OF HUNDREDS OF FOLLOWERS AFTER THE ARMED FORCES' EXPULSION OF THE FARC FROM ITS CASA VERDE SANCTUARY IN DECEMBER 1990 (FOUR MONTHS AFTER BECOMING FARC HEAD) MARULANDA HAS BEEN FEELING MESSIANIC AND SOMEWHAT LIKE MAO, WHOSE 1949 REVOLUTION STRONGLY INFLUENCED THE PCC AND FARC.

¶10. AN UNEDUCATED CAMPESINO, MARULANDA IS RESPECTED BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE INSURGENCY FOR HIS MILITARY SKILLS, BUT HAS NEVER PROFESSED TO HAVE POLITICAL SAVVY. NOR DOES HE HAVE POLITICAL AMBITIONS; HE HAS NO INTEREST IN A POST-INSURGENCY POLITICAL CAREER.

¶11. MARULANDA HAS NEITHER A GRAND VISION FOR COLOMBIA, NOR A SPECIFIC POLITICAL AGENDA. HE DOESN'T KNOW PRECISELY WHAT HE'S FIGHTING FOR. HIS MOTIVATION IS THE WELFARE OF "HIS PEOPLE," I.E., CAMPESINOS. WHILE THE GOVERNMENT TALKS ABOUT ENDING THE INSURGENCY, MARULANDA'S CONCERN IS WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO CAMPESINOS IF THEIR SELF-DEFENSE ARMY (THE FARC) DISAPPEARS.

¶12. OTHER THAN HIS ADOPTED COMMUNISM, MARULANDA HAS NO FIRM POLITICAL BELIEFS. HE USUALLY SIDES WITH FARC/PCC HARDLINERS, BUT A MORE PROMINENT FEATURE OF HIS PERSONALITY APPEARS TO BE HIS MALLEABILITY; MARULANDA IS OPEN TO PERSUASION. HE VARYINGLY HAS BEEN REPORTED TO BE A HARDLINER AND TO HAVE BEEN WON OVER TO HIS POLITICAL CHIEF ALFONSO CANO'S PRO-NEGOTIATED-PEACE POSITION. AT THE SAME TIME, HE HAS BEEN REPORTED TO BE MORE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF BOTH THE PCC AND THE ELN THAN HIS PREDECESSOR, JACOBO ARENAS.

¶13. INDEED, ONE CRITICISM OF MARULANDA IS THAT HE HAS PRESIDED OVER THE "ELENIZATION" OF THE FARC, I.E., THAT UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP (BEGINNING WITH THE DEATH OF JACOBO ARENAS IN AUGUST 1990) THE FARC HAS ADOPTED MANY OF THE ELN'S MILITARY TACTICS (E.G., ECONOMIC TERRORISM) WHILE MARULANDA HIMSELF HAS FALLEN INCREASING UNDER ELN HEAD MANUEL PEREZ' IDEOLOGICAL/POLITICAL INFLUENCE.

¶14. ONE PERSON'S ADVICE MARULANDA NEVER HAS SOUGHT IS FIDEL CASTRO'S. MARULANDA NEVER HAS HAD VERY CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE CUBAN LEADER, WHOM MARULANDA PREDATES AS A GUERRILLA AND NEVER HAS FIGURED HE HAD MUCH TO LEARN FROM. MARULANDA HAS TURNED DOWN SEVERAL INVITATIONS TO

VISIT CUBA. ONE RESULT IS THAT, TYPICAL OF FARC MILITARY LEADERS, MARULANDA HAS NO FORMAL MILITARY TRAINING.

¶15. VARIOUS SOURCES HAVE TALKED ABOUT MARULANDA'S ISOLATION IN THE JUNGLE; HE IS SAID TO BE OUT OF TOUCH WITH REALITY. MARULANDA RECEIVES VERY LITTLE INFORMATION FROM THE WORLD OUTSIDE HIS JUNGLE RETREATS OTHER THAN THAT EDITED BY HIS PCC VISITORS. CANO IS SAID TO BE UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE TO HIM WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE WORLD OUTSIDE HIS JUNGLE HAUNTS.

¶16. MARULANDA LAST VISITED A CITY, NEIVA IN HUILA DEPARTMENT (1985 POP. 178,000; HARDLY A METROPOLIS), IN 1963. HE REPORTEDLY NEVER HAS FLOWN ON AN AIRPLANE, NEVER LEFT COLOMBIA. ONE REASON HE REFUSES TO COME DOWN FROM THE MOUNTAINS IS HIS PARANOID FEAR FOR HIS LIFE. HE IS SAID TO FULLY TRUST NO ONE. THE PERSONS HE TRUSTS MOST ARE THOSE FEW FELLOW FARC GUERRILLAS WITH HIM SINCE THE EARLY YEARS.

¶17. FARC CONFIDANT MORITZ AKERMAN RELATED THE STORY OF HOW MARULANDA ONCE RECEIVED A GIFT BOTTLE OF WHISKEY (HIS FAVORITE DRINK) FROM CASTRO. FEARING BEING POISONED, TIROFIJO REFUSED TO DRINK IT, INSISTING ON THE BOTTLE BEING BROKEN IN FRONT OF HIM. TIROFIJO ALSO, ACCORDING TO AKERMAN, REFUSED TO TAKE PILLS CANO BROUGHT BACK FOR HIM FROM HIS NOVEMBER 1991 VISIT TO CUBA.

ALFONSO CANO: CITY-SMART BOY STUCK IN A CAMPESINO ARMY

¶18. THE FARC'S SECRETARIAT CAN BE VIEWED IN GENERAL AS FOUR PRO-ARMED STRUGGLE HARDLINERS AGAINST ONE PRO-NEGOTIATED PEACE MODERATE, ALFONSO CANO. GUILLERMO LEON SAENZ VARGAS (ALIAS ALFONSO CANO) IS THE SECOND IN COMMAND AND THE FARC'S IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL LEADER. CANO, MID-40S, IS FROM BOGOTA, WHERE HE STUDIED ANTHROPOLOGY AT THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, WHERE THE BEST BRAINS IN A GENERATION OF COLOMBIAN LEFTISTS WERE GATHERED. AT THE TIME, SAENZ (THE NON DE GUERRE WAS ADOPTED WHEN HE JOINED THE INSURGENCY) WAS ACTIVE IN THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY'S YOUTH MOVEMENT, JUCO. IN THE EARLY 1980S, JUST BEFORE COMPLETING HIS STUDIES, CANO LEFT TO JOIN THE FARC'S RURAL INSURGENCY.

¶19. CANO HAS NEVER COMMANDED A FRONT; INDEED, HE HAS NO MILITARY EXPERIENCE. FROM DAY ONE, HIS JOB HAS BEEN TO PROVIDE THE CAMPESINO ARMY WITH POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. HE REPORTEDLY WAS CLOSE TO FARC HEAD JACOBO ARENAS UNTIL HIS AUGUST 1990 HEART-ATTACK DEATH, AT WHICH TIME CANO REPLACED ARENAS AS THE FARC'S POLITICAL/IDEOLOGICAL CHIEF.

¶20. CANO WAS THE BEST AND BRIGHTEST OF A CROP OF JUCO ACTIVISTS THE PARTY SENT TO THE FARC IN THE EARLY 1980S OSTENSIBLY TO PROVIDE THE GUERRILLA GROUP WITH POLITICAL ADVICE, BUT ACTUALLY TO MAINTAIN THE PARTY'S INFLUENCE OVER THE RAPIDLY EXPANDING INSURGENCY.

¶21. ARENAS' DEATH LEFT CANO FAR AND AWAY THE MOST INTELLECTUALLY CAPABLE GUERRILLA LEADER, FARC OR ELN. THAT SUPERIOR INTELLECT, HOWEVER, COMBINED WITH HIS LACK OF MILITARY SKILLS AND THE FACT THAT HE IS AN EDUCATED "CITY BOY" IN A CAMPESINO ARMY, HAS STEERED HIM TOWARD BECOMING A SPOKESMAN/NEGOTIATOR/DIPLOMAT FOR THE INSURGENCY, RATHER THAN A LEADER OF IT. (FOR EXAMPLE, A PROBLEM FOR THE PEACE TALKS IS THAT CANO HAS LACKED DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY.)

¶22. SEVERAL SOURCES HAVE REPORTED CANO TO BE THE CONSUMMATE DIPLOMAT, NEVER LOSING CONTROL OF HIMSELF OR HIS TEMPER, ALWAYS CHOOSING HIS WORDS CAREFULLY. THAT'S EVIDENT IN BROADCAST INTERVIEWS. CARLOS EDUARDO JARAMILLO, WHO AS A GOC NEGOTIATOR SAT ACROSS THE TABLE FROM CANO FROM JUNE-NOVEMBER 1991 IN CARACAS, CREDITED CANO WITH KEEPING THE NEGOTIATING SESSIONS MOVING FORWARD. BY CONTRAST, JARAMILLO CHARACTERIZED THE OTHER CGSB NEGOTIATORS, INCLUDING IVAN MARQUEZ, AS "MILITARY TYPES" WHO WOULD STATE THEIR POSITION, THEN REFUSE TO

BUDGE. HE CREDITED CANO WITH ALWAYS MANEUVERING TO AVOID OR RESOLVE QUARRELS.

¶23. EVERYONE AGREES CANO IS THE CGSB'S MOST ACTIVE CATALYST FOR A NEGOTIATED END TO THE INSURGENCY. CANO UNDERSTANDS THAT THE INSURGENCY IS DEFEATED POLITICALLY, IF NOT YET MILITARILY. HE KNOWS THE ARMED STRUGGLE HAS NO FUTURE, NOR HE IN IT. CANO ALSO MAY BE EXPERIENCING A "MID-LIFE CRISIS," DREADING SPENDING THE REST OF HIS LIFE AS A GUERRILLA, AS DID ARENAS. HE WOULD LIKE TO DO SOMETHING ELSE BEFORE IT'S TOO LATE. AS AKERMAN ONCE TOLD POLOFF, "CANO WOULD RATHER BE NO. 50 IN SOMETHING THAT HAS A FUTURE THAN NO. 2 IN A DEAD-END VENTURE." CANO WOULD LIKE TO TRY HIS HAND AT POLITICS, BUT IS TRAPPED IN THE INSURGENCY. HE REALIZES THAT THE ONLY WAY TO GET OUT ALIVE IS TO BRING THE REST OF THE FARC WITH HIM, I.E., TO NEGOTIATE AN END TO THEIR ARMED STRUGGLE. BECAUSE HE IS THE INSURGENCY'S MOST PRO-PEACE LEADER, THE GOC WOULD PREFER TO DEAL WITH CANO THAN ANY OTHER GUERRILLA.

¶24. CANO HAS HIS FOLLOWERS IN THE FARC, AND IF HE LEFT THE INSURGENCY, POSSIBLY COULD TAKE A SIGNIFICANT PORTION (ESTIMATES VARY FROM 30-70 PERCENT) OF THE GUERRILLA GROUP WITH HIM. CANO, HOWEVER, PREFERS TO STRUGGLE FROM WITHIN TO DRAG TIROFIJO AND THE ENTIRE FARC INTO A PEACE AGREEMENT. THAT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE. IN TAKING THE SLOW, INTEGRAL APPROACH, CANO RISKS LOSING THE GOVERNMENT ALONG THE WAY (AS THE RECENT GOC TURN TOWARD A MORE MILITARISTIC APPROACH HAS SHOWN). AKERMAN HAS COUNSELED CANO THAT "HE HAS TO CHOOSE BETWEEN 30,000 INSURGENTS/SYMPATHIZERS AND 30 MILLION COLOMBIANS."

¶25. CANO'S PERSISTENCE IN PUSHING A NEGOTIATED END TO THE INSURGENCY HAS EARNED HIM THE WRATH OF HIS HARDLINE COMRADES IN BOTH THE FARC AND THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCC). THE PARTY IS NO MORE MONOLITHIC THAN THE FARC, HOWEVER, AND DEPENDING ON THE ISSUE, CANO OCCASIONALLY ENJOYS THE PARTY'S SUPPORT. FOR EXAMPLE, BOTH CANO AND THE PARTY (HISTORICALLY, THE "BRAINS" OF THE CAMPESINO ARMY) FEAR THEIR LOSS OF INFLUENCE AS MARULANDA HAS TURNED TOWARD GREATER IDEOLOGICAL AND TACTICAL ACCORD WITH THE ELN.

¶26. FEBRUARY'S DISAPPEARANCE OF CANO'S ASSISTANT IN PUSHING PEACE, FARC MEMBER DANIEL GARCIA, IS EVIDENCE THAT FARC/PCC HARDLINERS ARE WILLING TO GET TOUGH. SHORTLY BEFORE HE VANISHED, GARCIA (WHOM THE FARC "TRIED" TWICE FOR THE BOTCHED 1989 "COPACABANA" ARMS DEAL) REPORTEDLY SAID HIS ORDEAL WAS "THE FIRST CHAPTER IN A BOOK ABOUT CANO." AT THE JULY 4 RECEPTION, GEN. MANUEL BONNET, THE PREVIOUS HEAD OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, TOLD POLOFF HE COULDN'T BELIEVE CANO RECENTLY HAD OPTED TO RETURN TO HIS GUERRILLA COMRADES IN THE COLOMBIAN JUNGLE. CANO, WHO WAS VILIFIED (ALONG WITH GARCIA) AND TEMPORARILY DUMPED AS FARC NEGOTIATOR AT A JOINT FARC/PCC MEETING THE LAST TIME HE RETURNED HOME, IS KNOWN TO FEAR THAT EACH RETURN TO THE BUSH COULD REPRESENT THE BOOK'S FINAL CHAPTER.

RAUL REYES: THE PARTY'S MAN  
-----

¶27. RAUL REYES, THE FARC'S THIRD-RANKING LEADER, IS IN CHARGE OF LOGISTICS AND FINANCES. IT'S REYES WHO DISPENSES FUNDS TO SUPPORT THE PCC AND THE FARC'S URBAN FRONTS. LIKE CANO, REYES IS A POLITICAL LEADER WITH NO MILITARY EXPERIENCE.

¶28. REYES IS THE KEY MAN INSIDE THE FARC IN THE GUERRILLA GROUP'S SIBLING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY. WHILE ALL FIVE FARC SECRETARIAT MEMBERS ARE PCC MEMBERS, REYES SERVES AS "THE PARTY'S MAN" INSIDE THE FARC. WHILE HIS FELLOW SECRETARIAT MEMBERS, WHETHER MILITARY OR POLITICAL TYPES, WHETHER CAMPESINOS OR INTELLECTUALS, HAVE CLOSER TIES TO THE INSURGENCY THAN TO THE PARTY, REYES IS MORE COMMUNIST THAN GUERRILLA. IN THAT RESPECT, REYES IS UNIQUE IN THE FARC HIERARCHY. FROM JACOBO ARENAS TO ALFONSO CANO, THE PARTY, AS A RULE, HAS LOST CONTROL OVER THE YOUNG ACTIVISTS IT HAS SENT TO THE

FARC TO MAINTAIN ITS CONTROL OVER THE INSURGENCY.

¶29. REYES IS LINKED TO THE PARTY'S MOST INFLUENTIAL AND RADICAL FACTION, LED BY PARTY SECRETARIAT MEMBER MANUAL CEPEDA. REYES' MAIN POINT OF CONTACT IN THE PCC IS PARTY ORGANIZATION SECRETARY (AND CEPEDA-FACTION NUMBER) MILLER CHACON ("MISAE"), WHO REGULARLY TRAVELS FROM BOGOTA TO THE FARC'S SECRETARIAT.

TIMOLEON JIMENEZ: A BROWN-NOSE TO HIS MENTOR, TIROFIJO

¶30. TIMOLEON JIMENEZ ("TIMOCHENCO") IS FOURTH IN COMMAND AND IN CHARGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.

¶31. A CAMPESINO, JIMENEZ JOINED THE FARC AT 13, AND EARLY WAS "ADOPTED" BY MARULANDA, WITH WHOM HE HAS BEEN EVER SINCE. THE ADOLESCENT JIMENEZ FIRST WAS USED AS A GOPHER FOR THE SECRETARIAT, THEN LATER AS A COURIER. AS A TEEN-AGER, JIMENEZ SERVED AS A "STAFF ASSISTANT" TO THE SECRETARIAT. HE GREW UP WITH THE SECRETARIAT, AT TIROFIJO'S SIDE.

¶32. WHILE MARULANDA HAS MANY SONS IN THE FARC, NONE HAVE SPENT AS MUCH TIME WITH HIM OR ARE AS CLOSE TO HIM AS JIMENEZ, HIS CHOSEN PROTEGE. THERE IS LIKELY NO ONE THE PARANOID TIROFIJO TRUSTS MORE. JIMENEZ IS THE ONE MEMBER OF THE SECRETARIAT WHO IS NEVER SEPARATED FROM TIROFIJO.

¶33. JIMENEZ IS A REPLICA OF MARULANDA. LIKE HIS MENTOR, JIMENEZ IS AN UNEDUCATED CAMPESINO; A MILITARY LEADER (AND A NOTED ONE) NOT A POLITICAL ONE. LIKE TIROFIJO, JIMENEZ HAS NO FORMAL MILITARY TRAINING, AND HAS NEVER TRAVELED TO CUBA OR THE EAST BLOC.

¶34. WHILE FAR FROM BRILLIANT, JIMENEZ IS SMART ENOUGH TO KNOW WHAT SIDE HIS BREAD IS BUTTERED ON. HE ALWAYS AGREES WITH TIROFIJO. MARULANDA BELIEVES IN CONTINUING THE ARMED STRUGGLE, THEREFORE SO DOES JIMENEZ.

¶35. WHILE JIMENEZ IS ABOUT THE SAME AGE AS FELLOW SECRETARIAT MEMBERS CANO, REYES AND MARQUEZ, HE REPRESENTS A DIFFERENT CURRENT OF GUERRILLA LEADER. WHILE THEY JOINED THE FARC AFTER UNIVERSITY STUDIES AND CIVIL POLITICAL ACTIVISM, JIMENEZ AND OTHERS OF HIS ILK ARE CAMPESINOS WHO GREW UP IN THE INSURGENCY.

IVAN MARQUEZ: "MORE AMBITION THAN BRAINS"

¶36. WHEN FARC HEAD JACOBO ARENAS DIED IN AUGUST 1990, AND THE REMAINING FOUR FARC GENERAL SECRETARIAT MEMBERS ALL MOVED UP A NOTCH (WITH SECOND-IN-COMMANDER MARULANDA REPLACING ARENAS), IVAN MARQUEZ WAS ELEVATED TO THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT'S FIFTH AND LOWEST POSITION.

¶37. THE SECRETARIAT'S NEWEST MEMBER IS UNIQUE IN HAVING BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL CAPABILITY. MARQUEZ IS A PROVEN MILITARY LEADER WITH POLITICAL EXPERIENCE, HAVING SERVED BOTH AS A PATRIOTIC UNION (UP) CONGRESSMAN AND A CGSB/FARC NEGOTIATOR IN BOTH THE CARACAS AND TLAXCALA ROUNDS OF THE PEACE TALKS. AS HEAD OF THE FARC'S SOUTHERN BLOC IN HIS NATIVE CAQUETA DEPARTMENT BEFORE JOINING THE SECRETARIAT, MARQUEZ EARNED RESPECT FOR HIS MILITARY LEADERSHIP CAPABILITIES, HAVING ONCE WIPED OUT A PARAMILITARY GROUP IN PUTUMAYO DEPARTMENT LINKED TO MEDELLIN CARTEL CAPO GONZALO RODRIQUEZ GACHA.

¶38. MARQUEZ ALSO IS THE SECRETARIAT'S MOST ENIGMATIC MEMBER. SOURCES HAVE DIFFERED OVER WHETHER HE IS A HARDLINER. AMONG THOSE DENYING MARQUEZ IS A WARMONGER IS FORMER COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVIST ROBERTO SAENZ, BROTHER OF MARQUEZ' NEGOTIATING PARTNER, ALFONSO CANO. PRESIDENTIAL PEACE ADVISER GONZALO DE FRANCISCO HAS DESCRIBED MARQUEZ AS "A HARDLINER THE GOVERNMENT CAN DO BUSINESS WITH."

¶39. THE TRUTH MAY BE, AS ACADEMIC GUERRILLA EXPERT AND EX-COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVIST EDUARDO PIZARRO HAS REPORTED, THAT MARQUEZ "IS NOT A MAN TO LET HIS HEART GET



IN THE WAY OF HIS AMBITION." PEACE PROCESS PUSHER MORITZ AKERMAN, WHO KNOWS MARQUEZ, HAS CHARACTERIZED HIM AS FIRST AND FOREMOST AN AMBITIOUS OPPORTUNIST WHO "BLOWS WITH THE PREVAILING WIND." PIZARRO THINKS THAT MARQUEZ SHARES CANO'S BELIEF THAT THE INSURGENCY IS A DEAD-END, BUT THE PREVAILING WIND HAPPENS TO COME FROM THE DIRECTION OF DOMINANT FARC/PCC HARDLINERS, AND THUS SO BLOWS MARQUEZ.

¶40. MARQUEZ HAS VARIOUSLY BEEN REPORTED TO BE IN ACCORD WITH CANO, HIS FELLOW FARC NEGOTIATOR, AND AT ODDS WITH HIM, WHETHER OUT OF CONVICTION OR BECAUSE OF COMPETING AMBITIONS. MARQUEZ REPORTEDLY SHARES CANO'S DREAM OF A POST-INSURGENCY, POLITICAL CAREER; HOWEVER, WHILE CANO IS INTELLECTUALLY BRILLIANT, MARQUEZ IS MEDIOCRE. ALTHOUGH NOT AN UNEDUCATED CAMPESINO LIKE MARULANDA, MARQUEZ LACKS CANO'S INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT. AKERMAN HAS DESCRIBED MARQUEZ AS HAVING "MORE AMBITION THAN BRAINS."

¶41. MARQUEZ REPORTEDLY WAS NAMED TO THE FARC NEGOTIATING TEAM (A) BECAUSE OF HIS POLITICAL EXPERIENCE, (B) BECAUSE HE WANTED THE CHANCE IN THE LIMELIGHT, AND (C) TO KEEP AN EYE ON CHIEF FARC NEGOTIATOR CANO, WHO'S TOO MODERATE TO HAVE THE FULL CONFIDENCE OF HIS FELLOW SECRETARIAT MEMBERS AND THE PCC. WHEN AFTER THE CARACAS TALKS CANO WAS VILIFIED AND TEMPORARILY YANKED AS THE FARC NEGOTIATOR FOR BEING TOO SOFT, MARQUEZ WAS NAMED TO HEAD THE NEW HARDLINE FARC DELEGATION.

¶42. MARQUEZ' AMBITIONS ARE POLITICAL, NOT MILITARY; HE WANTS TO BE THE NEXT ANTONIO NAVARRO WOLFF, NOT REPLACE TIROFIJO. IT IS FOR THAT REASON THAT HE VIEWS CANO (RATHER THAN, FOR EXAMPLE, TIMOLEON JIMENEZ) AS HIS RIVAL, EVEN IF THEY MAY BE IN IDEOLOGICAL ACCORD.

¶43. MARQUEZ, WHO RECENTLY TOLD AKERMAN HE RECEIVED TRAINING IN THE SOVIET UNION, REPORTEDLY HARBORS DEEP HATRED FOR COLOMBIA'S SECURITY FORCES, WHO TORTURED AND KILLED A NON-GUERRILLA BROTHER OF HIS IN CAQUETA.

CONCLUSION: NONE OF THE DWARFS CAN REPLACE SNOW WHITE

-----  
¶44. DURING HIS LATE JUNE TRIP TO TLAXCALA, MEXICO, AKERMAN FOR THE FIRST TIME HEARD FARC GUERRILLAS TALKING ABOUT SUCCESSION TO MARULANDA. OVER A MEAL, FARC NEGOTIATORS PABLO CATATUMBO AND TOMAS LINCE -- BOTH CANO SUPPORTERS -- SAID THE PERSON MOST LIKELY TO SUCCEED MARULANDA WAS TIMOLEON JIMENEZ. JIMENEZ WAS SAID TO ENJOY THE ADVANTAGES OF BEING MARULANDA'S MOST TRUSTED CONFIDANT, AND OF HAVING THE SUPPORT OF JORGE BRICENO SUAREZ ("MONO JOJOY"), HEAD OF THE ESTADO MAYOR DEL BLOQUE ORIENTAL (EMBO), THE FIVE FARC FRONTS WHOSE PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITY IS TO PROTECT THE FARC GENERAL SECRETARIAT.

¶45. CATATUMBO AND LINCE NAMED MONO JOJOY AS THE SECOND MOST LIKELY TO REPLACE MARULANDA (AFTER JIMENEZ). MONO JOJOY REPORTEDLY IS THE SECRETARIAT'S FIRST ALTERNATE, MEANING HE'S NEXT IN LINE TO ASCEND TO THE FIVE-MEMBER BODY. JIMENEZ AND MONO JOJOY ARE THE FARC'S SECOND AND THIRD RANKING MILITARY LEADERS BEHIND MARULANDA. THE FARC'S ESTADO MAYOR (SECOND-TIER LEADERSHIP BODY) AND CAMPESINO RANK AND FILE APPEAR TO HAVE A BIAS IN FAVOR OF CAMPESINO/MILITARY LEADERS OVER INTELLECTUAL/POLITICAL ONES (LIKE CANO AND REYES).

¶46. THERE IS A MARKED DIFFERENCE IN STATUTE INSIDE THE FARC, HOWEVER, BETWEEN MARULANDA AND THE OTHER FOUR SECRETARIAT MEMBERS. AKERMAN HAS REFERRED TO THE SECRETARIAT AS "SNOW WHITE AND THE FOUR DWARFS" TO ILLUSTRATE THAT DIFFERENCE.

¶47. THE FARC FACES A LONG-TERM PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION FOR WHICH THERE APPEARS TO BE NO SOLUTION. MARULANDA, AS RESPECTED AS HE IS INSIDE THE FARC, IS INCAPABLE OF FULLY REPLACING ARENAS, WHO WAS A MILITARY, POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL GIANT. THERE IS NO ONE, HOWEVER, TO REPLACE MARULANDA. CANO OR REYES, AS INTELLECTUALS IN A CAMPESINO ARMY, NEVER WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE RANK AND FILE.

JIMENEZ, WHILE CUT FROM THE SAME MOLD AS MARULANDA, LACKS TIROFIJO'S SYMBOLIC SIGNIFICANCE. IT IS THE HISTORICAL FIGURE OF MARULANDA THAT HAS HELD THE FARC TOGETHER SINCE ARENAS' DEATH. IN AN ARMY WITH ONE GENERAL AND SEVERAL COLONELS, THE COLONELS WILL PROBABLY GO THEIR SEPARATE WAYS ONCE THE GENERAL HAS DEPARTED THE SCENE.

BUSBY